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In a series of different civil rights and constitutional con-
texts, litigators and scholars have argued about the merits of
equality versus privacy as the superior legal foundation for judi-
cial decision-making.' Whether in the area of reproductive free-
dom, gay rights, or women's rights, this debate has generated
considerable scholarly interest.2 The nominal organizing principle
of this Symposium panel, whether equal protection claims should
be advanced instead of privacy rights in cases of women's rights
and gay rights, was premised on this debate.' But I, like some of
my co-panelists, have chosen to "fight the hypo."' Although my
scholarship, most particularly my recent book, Battered Women
and Feminist Lawmaking,' has argued for the critical role of
equality in legal advocacy concerning intimate violence, and criti-
t Rose L. Hoffer Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. This essay is based on a
presentation at The University of Chicago Legal Forum Symposium, "The Scope of Equal
Protection," in October 2001. Thanks to Susan Herman, Nan Hunter, Pamela Karlan, and
Sylvia Law for comments on an earlier draft, to and Frank Michelman for helpful discus-
sion of the South African Constitutional Court. Special thanks to Rachel Braunstein for
superb research assistance and to the Faculty Research Program at Brooklyn Law School
for support.
See, for example, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive
Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L Rev 1183, 1185-1211 & n 7 (2000) (arguing that both equal
protection and due process theories are capable of destabilizing long-standing tradition,
but that due process protects individual rights more effectively, while equal protection
better guards group rights); Pamela S. Karlan, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality
in Relation to Justice Blackmun, 26 Hastings Const L Q 59, 61-70 & nn 11, 14 (arguing
that "liberty can serve to backstop equality"); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and
the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55
U Chi L Rev 1161, 1170-78 (1988) (arguing that equal protection is independent from, and
may be superior to, a claim under due process principles in the context of gay rights).
2 See note 1.
The title of the panel was "Equal Protection and Privacy Rights: Should Equal
Protection Be Used to Advance Privacy Rights?" My co-panelists were Professors Richard
Epstein, Andrew Koppelman, and Sanford Levinson.
4 See Richard A. Epstein, Liberty, Equality and Privacy: Choosing a Legal Founda-
tion for Gay Rights, 2002 U Chi Legal F 73; Sanford Levinson, The Warren Court Has Left
the Building: Some Comments on Contemporary Discussions of Equality, 2002 U Chi Legal
F 119.
5 Elizabeth M. Schneider, Battered Women And Feminist Lawmaking (Yale 2000).
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cized concepts of privacy that have immunized intimate violence
from state intervention, it also suggests the importance of looking
at concepts of privacy and equality in relation to each other.6 In
this essay I further develop these ideas and examine how equal-
ity and privacy must be viewed as inextricably linked and mutu-
ally dependent in women's rights cases.7 I argue that concepts of
equality are necessary for a robust understanding of privacy, and
concepts of privacy are necessary for the full realization of equal-
ity.
My work in the area of women's rights and domestic vio-
lence-in which I have argued that understandings of gender
equality can shape a more affirmative right of privacy, and that
understandings of privacy must be shaped by recognition of the
problems of inequality and unequal access-is the backdrop for
this discussion. This essay begins with a brief overview of the
juxtaposition of privacy and equality in women's rights cases,
then suggests how looking at equality and privacy in tandem can
deepen our thinking about each in isolation.
I. GENDER, PRIVACY, AND EQUALITY
Scholars have debated the merits of privacy versus equality
in women's rights cases extensively, particularly with respect to
issues of reproductive rights. 8 Roe v Wade' was decided by the Su-
6Id at 87-90.
Anita L. Allen, in The Proposed Equal Protection Fix for Abortion Law: Reflections
on Citizenship, Gender and the Constitution, 18 Harv J L &, Pub Pol 419 (1995), uses the
terms 'mutual dependence" and "co-dependency." See id at 421 n 5 ("Privacy and equal
protection are mutually dependent, in my view, inasmuch as privacy rights can promote
equality and equal protection can promote privacy and privacy-related liberties."). Pamela
Karlan has recently examined the interplay between due process and equal protection,
which she describes as "bidirectional." Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process
and The Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, __ McGeorge L Rev - (forthcoming). She
suggests, and I agree, that 'sometimes looking at an issue stereoscopically-through the
lenses of both the due process clause and the equal protection clause-can have synergis-
tic effects, producing results that neither clause might reach by itself." Id.
8 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 184-94 (Har-
vard 1989) (criticizing the privacy right as the underpinning of abortion rights); Catharine
A. MacKinnon, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in Feminism Unmodified 93, 96
(Harvard 1987) (arguing that the reasoning of Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973), "translates
the ideology of the private sphere into the individual woman's legal right to privacy as a
means of subordinating women's collective needs to the imperatives of male supremacy");
Ruth Colker, An Equal Protection Analysis of United States Reproductive Health Policy:
Gender, Race, Age and Class, 1991 Duke L J 324, 356-57 (1991) (asserting that 'the pri-
vacy approach is no longer superior to the equal protection approach" because the Court
has "watered down the privacy standard," but concluding that "the development of the
equal protection doctrine might be politically and legally advantageous"); Martha Albert-
son Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The Limits of Privacy, 23 Conn L
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preme Court under a right to privacy framework, 10 although ar-
guments based upon equality and broader issues such as involun-
tary servitude," were advanced in Roe and in early cases revolv-
Rev 955, 955-56 (1991) (criticizing the constitutional doctrine of privacy as applied to
rights of single mothers and arguing that an emphasis on privacy obscures the usefulness
of other legal doctrines); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under
Law, 100 Yale L J 1281, 1311 (1991) ('[Wihile the private has been a refuge for some, it
has been a hellhole for others.. . . Everyone is implicitly equal in there. If the woman
needs something-say equality-to make these assumptions real, privacy law does noth-
ing for her, and even ideologically undermines the state intervention that might provide
the preconditions for its meaningful exercise. The private is a distinctive sphere of
women's equality to men."); Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way out
of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 Colum L Rev 1118, 1120 (1986) (critiquing
the public-private divide as it relates to maternity and the workplace and proposing a new
constitutional equality theory); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts On Autonomy and
Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 NC L Rev 375, 386 (1985) (criticizing the pre-
dominance of privacy ideology in reproductive rights cases and arguing that "the Court's
Roe position is weakened ... by the opinion's concentration on a medically approved
autonomy idea, to the exclusion of a constitutionally based sex-equality perspective");
Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U Pa L Rev 955, 1020 (1984)
("The rhetoric of privacy, as opposed to equality, blunts our ability to focus on the fact that
it is women who are oppressed when abortion is denied .... The rhetoric of privacy also
reinforces a public/private dichotomy that is at the heart of the structures that perpetuate
the powerlessness of women.").
9 410 US 113 (1973).
10 The Court, in Roe, framed the right to abortion in terms of a right to privacy.
Specifically, the Court found the right to privacy implicit in the Due Process guarantee of
the Fourteenth Amendment, "broad enough to encompass a women's decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy." 410 US at 153. The formulation of the reproductive right
in Roe was preceded by the recognition of penumbral privacy rights. Griswold v Connecti-
cut, 381 US 479, 483-86 (1965) (finding the right of married couples to obtain contracep-
tives within the constitutional zones of privacy in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights,
which encompassed reproductive autonomy). The Roe Court acknowledged that framing
the right to abortion in terms of constitutional privacy was appropriate in part because
that rights rhetoric was "broad." 410 US at 153. However, the privacy right was not abso-
lute. Rather, the court concluded "the right of personal privacy includes the abortion deci-
sion, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state
interests in regulation." Id at 154. Scholars, such as those cited in note 8, have critiqued
the application of the doctrine of constitutional privacy as insufficient to fully protect
women's reproductive rights.
" See Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of Organizations and Named Women in support of
Appellants, Roe v Wade, No 70-18 & 70-40, *6-19, reprinted in Roy M. Mersky & Gary R.
Hartman, 2 A Documentary History of the Legal Aspects of Abortion in the United States:
Roe v. Wade 223, 240-53 (Rothman 1993) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment pro-
tects women from the involuntary servitude imposed on them by unwanted pregnancy,
which may be the result of failed contraception or their impeded ability to refuse sexual
intercourse). See also Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of Women's Organizations and Named
Women in Support of Appellants, Roe v Wade, No 70-18 & 70-40, *25, reprinted in Mersky
& Hartman, 2 Documentary History at 405, 439 ("A woman whom the law would force to
carry an unwanted pregnancy to term is, quite plainly, restricted and imposed upon to a
greater degree than by any other action the state could take, save execution of a sentence
of death or possibly long term imprisonment."). The argument against unwanted preg-
nancy as involuntary servitude was later adopted by judges. See Roe v Rampton, 394 F
Supp 677, 689 (D Utah 1975) (Ritter dissenting) (arguing that compelling women to re-
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ing around reproductive freedom. Gendered ideas about repro-
duction as central to women's equality were presented to courts
in the early litigation context of reproductive freedom, although
courts, for the most part, ignored them."2 Much of the feminist
debate that developed after Roe about the problematic nature of
the decisional framework, that privacy was individualistic as a
negative right-the right "to be let alone"-versus equality, often
did not distinguish between the Supreme Court's choice of pri-
vacy as Roe's decisional framework, and the equality arguments
that had been advanced by feminist advocates. 3 Arguably, as-
pects of these early equality perspectives have been integrated
into later reproductive rights rulings."
main pregnant is a form of involuntary servitude). More recently, this position has been
invoked in the abortion context. See Jane L. v Bangerter, 794 F Supp 1537, 1548-49 (D
Utah 1992) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether
the Utah Abortion Act violated the Thirteenth Amendment in imposing on women a condi-
tion of involuntary servitude).
12 Amici argued that the Connecticut law at issue in Griswold violated women's
equality under the Equal Protection Clause. See Brief for the American Civil Liberties
Union and the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae, Griswold v Connecticut,
No 496, *16, reprinted in Roy M. Mersky & Jill Duffy, A Documentary History of the Legal
Aspects of Abortion in the United States: Griswold v. Connecticut (Rothman 2001) ("In
contemporary times, the liberty of 'establishing a home' encompasses ... the wife's right
to order her child-bearing according to her financial and emotional needs, her abilities,
and her achievements . . . . Thus, the equal protection clause protects the class of women
who wish to delay or regulate child-bearing effectively."). Then, in Roe, amici argued that
the Texas law at issue infringed upon women's right to equality. In Brief Amicus Curiae
on Behalf of New Women Lawyers, Women's Health and Abortion Project, Inc, National
Abortion Action Coalition, Roe v Wade, No 70-18 & 70-40, *25-33, reprinted in Mersky &
Hartman, 2 Documentary History at 143, 187-95 (cited in note 11) (arguing that laws
forcing women to carry pregnancies to term violate women's right to equal protection).
Amici also argued that Texas' anti-abortion law at issue in Roe arbitrarily excluded a class
of women-including women who became pregnant as a result of rape or incest and
women for whom bearing another child would pose substantial financial hardship-from
receiving therapeutic abortions and thus violated the right to equality for those women.
Brief Amici Curiae National Legal Program on Health Problems of the Poor, National
Welfare Rights Organization, American Public Health Association, Roe v Wade, No 70-18
& 70-40, *37-42, reprinted in Mersky & Hartman, 2 Documentary History at 89, 137-42.
In addition to arguing that anti-abortion laws violated women's right to equal protection,
amici in Roe asserted that the laws transgressed the equality rights of poor and non-white
women. Id at *33-37, reprinted in Mersky & Hartman, 2 Documentary History at 133-37;
see also Supplemental Brief for Amici Curiae Planned Parenthood Federation of America,
Inc and American Association of Planned Parenthood Physicians, Roe v Wade, No 70-18 &
70-40, *8-9, reprinted in Mersky & Hartman, 2 Documentary History at 331, 346-47;
Brief for State Communities And Association as Amici Curiae, Roe v Wade, No 70-18 & 70-
40, *4-12, reprinted in Mersky & Hartman, 2 Documentary History at 371, 380-88.
'3 See note 8.
14 See Thornburgh v American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 US
747, 772 (1986) ("A woman's right to make that choice freely [to end her pregnancy] is
fundamental. Any other result, in our view, would protect inadequately a central part of
the sphere of liberty that our law guarantees equally to all."), overruled by Planned Par-
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One can see some analogues to this history in the context of
gay rights litigation, where privacy and equality arguments have
intersected as well. In Bowers v Hardwick,5 the Court based its
decision on privacy rather than equality, 6 despite the fact that
arguments concerning equality were advanced there by advocates
enthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833 (1992); Cleveland Board of
Education v LaFleur, 414 US 632, 651-57 (1974) (Powell concurring) (arguing that policy
requiring public school teachers to take unpaid maternity leave violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause); Eisenstadt v Baird, 405 US 438 (1972) (holding that state law prohibiting
distribution of contraceptives to unwed persons violated the Equal Protection Clause). See
also text accompanying notes 47-59 (discussing Casey).
is 478 US 186 (1986).
'6 In Bowers, the Court held that there was no fundamental right to privacy encom-
passing the right for homosexuals to engage in sodomy. Id at 195-96. The Court analyzed
respondent's challenge to a Georgia law that criminalized sodomy under the privacy
precedent regarding family or marriage issues and under the privacy protection tradition-
ally afforded activity within the home. Id at 190-91, 195-96. Significantly, the Court
characterized the right that respondent urged it to recognize as a right to engage in homo-
sexual sodomy. Id at 190. Not surprisingly, the Court did not find an applicable right to
privacy either in the text of the Constitution regarding matters of reproduction or family,
or in the cases finding a right to residential privacy. Bowers, 478 US at 190-91, 195-96.
The Court thus avoided applying strict scrutiny to the right before it and lowered the bar
on review of state regulation in this area.
Although the Bowers ruling was fatal to the advancement of gay rights under the
constitutional privacy doctrine, the decision does have import with respect to the connec-
tion of the privacy and equality doctrines. In his majority opinion, Justice White concluded
that moral concern was sufficient to form the rational basis necessary to uphold the law.
Id at 196. Justice White also noted that the respondent in the case did not defend the
appellate court's judgment in his favor on equal protection grounds. Id at 196 n 8. In his
dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, reasoned
that even though the respondent did not make an equal protection argument, equality was
relevant to the analysis of his privacy challenge. Id at 202. In a separate dissent, Justice
Stevens argued that the Georgia statute was unequally applied to homosexuals' conduct in
light of the equivalent liberty interests of heterosexual and homosexual individuals. Bow-
ers, 478 US at 218-19.
The Supreme Court has now granted certiorari in a case that may overrule Bowers.
In reviewing Lawrence v State, 41 SW3d 349 (Tex App 2001), cert granted as Lawrence v
Texas, 123 S Ct 661 (2002), the Supreme Court will consider the convictions of two men
under the Texas "homosexual conduct law" which makes it a crime to engage in "deviate
sexual intercourse"-defined as oral and anal sex-with another person of the same sex.
Id at 350. Unlike the statute upheld in Bowers, the Texas statute criminalizes same-sex
sexual activity but does not criminalize the same opposite sex activity. Id. The case also
presents two equality claims: whether the Texas statute impermissibly discriminates on
the basis of sexual orientation, id at 353 and whether it discriminates on the basis of sex.
Lawrence, 41 SW3d at 357. Ruth Harlow, Legal Director of Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund, who represents the two defendants, has said, "We're looking forward to
making a powerful and convincing case that these laws are an affront to equality, invade
the most private sphere of adult life and harm gay people in so many ways." James Vicini,
Supreme Court to Decide Texas Sodomy Law, Reuters (Dec 2, 2002), available online at
<http://news.findlaw.com/news/s/20021202/courtsodomydc.html> (visited on Dec 12, 2002)
[on file with U Chi Legal F]. See also Kenji Yoshino, Can the Supreme Court Change Its
Mind?, NY Times A45 (Dec 5, 2002).
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as well. V However, in Romer v Evans,"8 the Court incorporated
aspects of the equality framework argued in earlier decisions. 9
Despite the fact that courts have relied on privacy in these
cases in problematic ways, it is important to move beyond the
notions that equality should always trump privacy and that
equality is the superior framework upon which the Court should
17 See Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the Respondents by Lambda Legal Defense
and Education Fund, Inc, et al, Bowers v Hardwick, No 85-140, Point II (filed Jan 31,
1986) ("This Court should assure that all are given equal protection of this right [to sexual
privacy] to make those private decisions free of overbroad and unjustified government
intrusion."); Brief of Amicus Curiae the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A), et al, Bowers v
Hardwick, No 85-140, (filed Jan 31, 1986) (arguing that the Georgia statute contravenes
homosexuals' entitlement to the equal protection of the laws); Brief of the National Or-
ganization for Women as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Bowers v Hardwick,
No 85-140, (filed Jan 31, 1986) (arguing that Georgia law violates equal protection rights
of Hardwick and homosexuals generally); Brief Amicus Curiae for Lesbian Rights Project,
et al, Bowers v Hardwick, No 85-140, (filed Jan 31, 1986) (arguing that the Georgia law
violates the rights of gays to equality). All of these briefs are available on Lexis by search-
ing for "name (Bowers AND Hardwick)" in the US Supreme Court Briefs database. See
also Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the New Rhetoric of
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 Am U L Rev 77, 146 n 354 (1995) (arguing that the
Court's choice in Bowers of a privacy framework as opposed to an equality theory dictated
the level of scrutiny given the right in question). Courts have generally preferred a privacy
right to an equality argument when both were advanced in cases such as Dronenberg v
Zech, 741 F2d 1388, 1391 (DC Cir 1984) (holding that homosexual appellant's privacy
right trumped his equal protection challenge to the Navy's dismissal policy). The Bowers
decision, although based on a privacy framework, implicated equality concerns for gay
rights activists. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylaw: Challenging the Apartheid of the
Closet 209-11 (Harvard 1999) (arguing that although Bowers did not address equal pro-
tection principles, in light of Romer v Evans, the distinction made by the Court between
criminalizing "homosexual" and "heterosexual" sodomy might not withstand constitutional
challenge); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Relationship Between Obligations and Rights of
Citizens, 69 Fordham L Rev 1721, 1745 (2001) ("One can read the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Bowers v. Hardwick for the proposition that, because Congress and the states can
make consensual sodomy a serious crime, they can also treat presumptive sodomites as
second-class citizens.").
18 517 US 620 (1996).
19 Id at 631-36 (holding that an amendment to the Colorado State Constitution which
denied gays and lesbians any civil rights protection against discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation failed rational basis equal protection scrutiny). Scholars have criticized
Romer as a convoluted or incomplete application of the equal protection doctrine to gay
rights. See, for example, Nan D. Hunter, Proportional Equality: Readings of Romer, 89 Ky
L J 885, 886 (2001) (arguing that Romer was an "incomplete" decision).
However, Romer, along with Bowers, demonstrates the applicability of the doctrines
of privacy and equality to gay rights. Doctrines of privacy and equality have been dually
implicated in the context of same-sex marriage. The plaintiffs in Baehr v Lewin, 852 P2d
44 (Haw 1993), argued that the denial of a marriage license to them as a same-sex couple
violated their rights to privacy and to equal protection under the state constitution. Id at
50. The Court denied the plaintiffs' privacy challenge, id at 57, but remanded the case for
strict scrutiny review of the equal protection claim, id at 68. In other words, where the
privacy doctrine has failed to advance gay rights, equal protection analysis becomes a
relevant constitutional theory.
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base its decisions. Instead, we should look at privacy and equality
in tandem. This is particularly important because both equality
and privacy have been interpreted in deeply flawed ways.
Constitutional frameworks of equality have been inadequate
to grapple with many core issues of gender discrimination. '° The
Supreme Court has perceived how the application of traditional
stereotypes can harm untraditional women, such as recognizing
that Virginia's all-women alternative was "distinctly inferior" to
its state-run elite military institute for men," but the application
of an intermediate standard of scrutiny has often reinforced gen-
der stereotypes." Equal protection has failed to include preg-
nancy,' and the requirement of discriminatory purpose from Per-
sonnel Administrator of Massachusetts v Feeney has immunized
and perpetuated gender discrimination.4 As a constitutional mat-
ter, equal protection has not reached many of the areas that are
most central to women's lives: pregnancy, reproductive rights,
20 See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 Stan L Rev 1111, 1129-46 (1997) (arguing that the
"discriminatory purpose" doctrine of the Equal Protection Clause perpetuates gender dis-
crimination).
21 United States v Virginia, 518 US 515, 566 (1996).
22 Laws infringing constitutional privacy rights have typically been afforded strict
scrutiny. See, for example, Griswold, 381 US at 485 (holding that a "governmental pur-
pose ... may not be achieved by means which sweep impermissibly broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms"). However, courts analyzing equal protection issues
with respect to gender apply intermediate scrutiny. Virginia, 518 US at 532-33. Scholars
dispute the significance of this distinction for framing constitutional rights claims. See
Daly, 45 Am U L Rev at 78 & n 3 (cited in note 18) (noting arguments that "abortion laws
deny equal protection, at least as much as they impinge on personal privacy"). See also
Elizabeth M. Schneider, A Postscript on VMI, 6 Am U J Gender L 59, 60-62 (1997) (argu-
ing that the notion of "inherent differences" between men and women as a "cause for cele-
bration" is still problematic). But see Scott M. Smiler, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
the Virginia Military Institute: A Culmination of Strategic Success, 4 Cardozo Women's L J
541, 577-83 (1998) (concluding that Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Virginia strategically
heightened the scrutiny for gender classifications under equal protection jurisprudence).
2' In Geduldig v Aiello, 417 US 484 (1974), the Court held that California's disability
insurance system, which excluded pregnancy as a disability, was constitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Id at 497. The Court found no evidence
of invidious gender discrimination and stated that "while it is true that only women can
become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning preg-
nancy is a sex-based classification." Pregnancy is merely an "objectively identifiable physi-
cal condition" and '[aibsent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere
pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or
the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the
coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any
other physical condition." Id at 496 n 20.
24 442 US 256, 273-74 (1979) (holding that a facially gender-neutral statute does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause absent gender-based discriminatory purpose or in-
tent). See also Siegel, 49 Stan L Rev at 1111, 1134-41 (cited in note 20).
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and violence."5 While the notion of replacing privacy and its limi-
tations with a broader framework of equality might not be prob-
lematic under an ideal vision of equality, it is far more problem-
atic under the Rehnquist Court's actual interpretations of equal-
ity.2 Similarly, conventional notions of privacy, as reflected in
Roe, have been weak, and focused more on doctors' privacy than
women's. In domestic violence, privacy rationales have supported
violence.27 Thus, in application, judicial interpretations of both
equality and privacy have been flawed.
Some commentators who have considered this comparative
perspective have argued that there is no necessary preference
between the two, particularly when one evaluates them in prac-
tice. Bill Eskridge, for example, describes a "destabilizing due
process" and an "evolutive equal protection," focusing on the way
in which privacy concepts have a destabilizing impact in terms of
individual rights, and equal protection has only a partial impact
in terms of group rights." Eskridge emphasizes that in the area of
gay rights, equality claims have been limited.29 He notes that in
the area of women's rights, privacy and due process claims have
been more effective in establishing new laws for women in cases
like Cleveland Board of Education v La Fleur 0, dealing with ma-
ternity leave, and Roe.31 In contrast, under equality claims, cases
like Feeney and Geduldig v Aiello 2 have posed substantial obsta-
cles.3 Yet, even where the either/or choice is rejected theoreti-
cally, it may still operate pragmatically. Indeed, Pamela Karlan
argues that
25 The Court's recent decision in United States v Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613-27
(2000) (rejecting Congress's findings that gender-motivated violence substantially affects
interstate commerce, thus concluding that Congress lacked authority under its Commerce
Clause power to enact the civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act and to
provide federal civil remedies under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment), striking
down the civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, is another example.
'6 See Siegel, 49 Stan L Rev at 1111, 1143 (cited in note 20) ('The governing equal
protection framework identifies race- and gender-conscious remedies as pernicious 'dis-
crimination,' while deflecting attention from the many ways that the state continues to
regulate the status of minorities and women").
27 See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 Conn L Rev 973
(1991).
"' Eskridge, 47 UCLA L Rev at 1183-1219 (cited in note 1).
Id at 1200.
30 414 US 632 (1974).
31 Eskridge, 47 UCLA L Rev at 1199-1200 (cited in note 1).
32 417 US 484 (1974).
3 Eskridge, 47 UCLA L Rev at 1199-1200 (cited in note 1).
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[alithough much of the existing scholarship assumes, at
least as a theoretical matter, that "the rhetorics of rights
and equality do not pose an 'either-or' choice [and that]
both are needed in the defense of constitutional values," it
does not really apply that principle to concrete cases. In-
stead, it usually argues that a court faced with a constitu-
tional challenge should apply one clause rather than the
other, either because the claim is intrinsically better ad-
dressed under one rubric or because, as a tactical matter,
precedent forecloses resort to the other clause."
As Karlan suggests, the challenge is to "apply [the] principle"
that both privacy and equality are necessary "to concrete cases."
II. INTERSECTIONS OF PRIVACY AND EQUALITY
In this section I argue for the importance of viewing privacy
and equality in tandem and examine the synergy between the
two doctrines in women's rights cases. Inequality plays a critical
role in determining whose privacy counts. We need a richer con-
cept of privacy, shaped by understandings of equality, and we
need to shape and deepen our understanding of equality through
examination of aspects of privacy.
My scholarship has examined the meaning of claims of pri-
vacy and equality in a number of different areas relating to issues
of gender, including reproductive freedom35 and intimate vio-
lence. 6 I have argued that privacy was the major ideological ra-
tionale for state refusal to intervene to protect battered women,
and that notions "of marital privacy have been a source of oppres-
sion to battered women and have helped to maintain women's
subordination within the family."' I have examined "ways that
concepts of privacy permit, encourage and reinforce violence
against women, focusing on the complex interrelationship be-
tween notions of 'public' and 'private' in our social understand-
ings of woman-abuse."' But, at the same time, I have argued for
3 Karlan, __ McGeorge L Rev at __ (forthcoming) (cited in note 7), citing Kenneth
Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 Ga L Rev 245 (1983).
3 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Affirmative Dimension of Douglas's Privacy, in
Stephen L. Wasby, ed, "He Shall Not Pass this Way Again": The Legacy of Justice William
0. Douglas 179 (Pittsburgh 1990) (advocating a conception of privacy as an affirmative
right to autonomy and self-expression).
'6 Schneider, 23 Conn L Rev at 973 (cited in note 27).
37 Id at 975.
Id at 974.
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the development of affirmative conceptions of privacy, based on
Justice Douglas's opinion in Griswold v Connecticut,"9 linked to
liberty and the right to self-expression and self-determination, as
crucial aspects of battered women's empowerment. "Battered
women seek autonomy, freedom of choice with respect to the ba-
sic decisions of life concerning intimate association, freedom from
battering and coercion, and freedom to be themselves. They seek
the freedom to survive free from violence."' 9
Anita Allen's work has offered a nuanced framework for
thinking about gender and privacy. The problem has been, to use
Allen's words, that women had both the "wrong kinds of privacy"
and "too much privacy in the sense of imposed modesty, chastity,
and domestic isolation," and not enough of the right kind of pri-
vacy "in the sense of adequate opportunities for individual modes
of privacy and private choice."' Gender and inequality are key
here. Allen suggests that "women are particularly vulnerable to
privacy problems because they are perceived as inferiors, ancil-
laries, and safe targets and that women's privacy is sometimes
probed by others who implicitly assume that daughters, pregnant
women, mothers, and wives are more accountable for their pri-
vate conduct than their male counterparts."
These are important dimensions of privacy that are not fully
developed in contemporary doctrine. Applying these more af-
firmative concepts of privacy linked to autonomy and liberty to
the domestic violence context, for example, would mean that a
right to shelter and confidentiality of battered women's disclo-
sures to counselors would be protected. Remedies for intimate
violence would have to preserve opportunities for safety, for se-
clusion, for intimacy, and for individual decision-making.4
Issues of whose privacy counts and what privacy they are
afforded thus raise fundamental issues of equality. Arguments
that welfare recipients should be guaranteed rights to privacy
that were made fifteen years ago, have now virtually disappeared
both from the law and from the scholarly literature." In a sense,
39 381 US 479 (1965).
40 Schneider, 23 Conn L Rev at 998 (cited in 27).
4, Anita L. Allen, Gender and Privacy in Cyberspace, 52 Stan L Rev 1175, 1177 (2000).
42 Id at 1178.
See Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 Wm and Mary L Rev 723, 746 (1999).
44 See Wyman v James, 400 US 309 (1971) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that home
visits mandated by New York law as part of AFDC assistance program violated her right
to privacy under the Fourth Amendment); Robin Morris Collin & Robert William Collin,
Are the Poor Entitled to Privacy?, 8 Harv Blackletter J 181 (1991) (arguing that the poor
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there is no longer an argument that poor people even have pri-
vacy rights. In gay rights, the failure of the Court's decision in
Bowers to recognize privacy led gay rights activists and scholars
to raise equality concerns. 5 Critics have argued that unless we
look at equality as a primary framework for gay rights, and see
heterosexual and homosexual families as equal, courts (and the
public) will not be able to address and remedy problems that are
most fundamental for gays and lesbians: issues of family life,
such as gay marriage and adoption."
In reproductive freedom we can see the important intersec-
tion of privacy and equality as well. Roe v Wade recognized a
right to privacy, although largely in the context of medical deci-
sion making, and it did not acknowledge the central role of repro-
ductive choice to women's equality. Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v Casey47 is understood as the case that, by
a narrow margin, kept reproductive rights in some protected
category." But Casey was decided under the substantive due
are entitled to stronger privacy rights); Douglas Q. Wickham, Restricting Home Visits:
Toward Making the Life of the Public Assistance Recipient Less Public, 118 U Pa L Rev
1188 (1970) (arguing that public assistance programs should do more to respect privacy
rights of the recipient). See also Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have
Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 Harv L Rev 1419 (1991)
(advocating for the affirmative rights of equality and privacy for women facing criminal
charges for using drugs during pregnancy). Although Roberts does not exclusively focus on
welfare recipients, she does argue that criminal laws in this area disproportionately affect
poor, black women who "are in closer contact with government agencies," through welfare
and similar programs. Id at 1432.
41 See Pruitt v Cheney, 963 F2d 1160 (9th Cir 1991) (finding that plaintiff stated claim
that the Army violated her right to equal protection when it discharged her because she
was homosexual). See also Hunter, 89 Ky L J at 893-94 (cited in note 19) (noting that
equal protection arguments based on Romer are more effective in gay rights litigation);
Courtney G. Joslin, Equal Protection and Anti-Gay Legislation: Dismantling the Legacy of
Bowers v. Hardwick-Romer v. Evans, Recent Development, 32 Harv CR-CL L Rev 225,
229-30 (1997) (asserting that advocates after Bowers raised equal protection issues in the
context of gay rights, although acceptance of this rights framework has not been entirely
successful); Sunstein, 55 U Chi L Rev at 1163-64 (cited in note 1) (arguing that because
due process analysis, so limited by the Bowers decision, is independent from equal protec-
tion analysis, the latter may offer constitutional protection to gays against sexual orienta-
tion discrimination). Litigators framed their claims as equal protection claims after the
Bowers decision limited the reach of the privacy doctrine to gay rights.
46 See Baehr v Lewin, 852 P2d 44 (Haw 1993) (denying gay appellants' privacy chal-
lenge to the denial of a same-sex marriage license, but remanding the case for strict scru-
tiny review of their equal protection claim); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Equality Practice:
Liberal Reflections on the Jurisprudence of Civil Unions, 64 Albany L Rev 853 (2001)
(reviewing the framework of "equality practice" inherent in Baker v State, 744 A2d 864 (Vt
1999), and Vermont's enactment of legislation granting same-sex civil unions).
47 505 US 833 (1992).
Id at 876-79 (adopting an "undue burden" standard).
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process guarantee of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment, 9 and
the Court began its plurality opinion in Casey by redefining the
right recognized in Roe as a right to liberty,0 a right to autonomy
with respect to intimate decisions, such as reproductive choice.5'
The Court seems to formulate a right to self-determination im-
plicit in the right to reproductive autonomy: "At the heart of lib-
erty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of mean-
ing, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."' And it
has been argued that by discussing the right to abortion secured
for women in Roe as grounded in a right to liberty, as distinct
from a right to privacy, the Court in Casey integrated aspects of
equal protection analysis.53
The Court, in Casey, appears to employ some measure of
equality analysis, an equal participation or social equality argu-
ment, in recognizing that "[tihe ability of women to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been fa-
cilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives."4 An
49 Id at 846.
60 Id at 844.
6' Casey, 505 US at 851.
52 Id.
Daly, 45 Am U L Rev at 118-26 (cited in note 17).
'4 Casey, 505 US at 856. In Casey, the Court explicitly acknowledged the significance
of abortion as guaranteeing women social equality as equal participants in society: "The
ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has
been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives." Id at 856. Justice Ste-
vens also noted the relationship between abortion rights and equality: "Roe is an integral
part of a correct understanding of both the concept of liberty and the basic equality of men
and women." Id at 912 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part). Stevens later
notes, "[Plart of the constitutional liberty to choose is the equal dignity to which each of us
is entitled." Id at 920. In his opinion, Justice Blackmun suggests,
A State's restrictions on a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy also
implicate constitutional guarantees of gender equality. State restrictions
on abortion compel women to continue pregnancies they might otherwise
terminate.... This assumption-that women can simply be forced to ac-
cept the "natural" status and incidents of motherhood-appears to rest
upon a conception of women's role that has triggered the protection of the
Equal Protection Clause.
Casey, 505 US at 928 (Blackmun concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Referring to such citations from Casey as reflecting dimensions of equality, some
scholars argue that the Court undertook equal protection analysis in dicta. Daly, 45 Am U
L Rev at 118-26 (cited in note 17); see also David B. Cruz, "The Sexual Freedom Cases"?
Contraception, Abortion, Abstinence, and the Constitution, 35 Harv CR-CL L Rev 299,
357-58 (2000) ("[M]any commentators insist that [the gender equality] approach nonethe-
less provides the best justification for the Court's actions."); Stephanie S. Gold, Note, An
Equality Approach to Wrongful Birth Statutes, 65 Fordham L Rev 1005, 1026-27 (1996)
(noting the emphasis in Casey on the equality implications of pregnancy and family plan-
ning for women); David H. Gans, Note, Stereotyping and Difference: Planned Parenthood
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equality argument appears to underlie the Court's constitutional
invalidation of the spousal notification provision of the Pennsyl-
vania law." The Court reviewed the district court's findings of
fact with respect to the provision's implication of domestic vio-
lence, concluding that the provision would impose a substantial
obstacle to women who could not safely consult their husbands
for fear of violence.' The Court recognized that the spousal notifi-
cation provision reflected the subordination of wives to their hus-
bands," and suggested that the provision discriminated against
some married women by imposing a more substantial burden on
their abortion choice than on their single counterparts. The
Court's analysis of the spousal notification provision evinces con-
sideration of aspects of equality along with privacy and liberty
principles, and suggests the interrelationship between privacy,
liberty and equality. 8
At the same time the Casey Court's larger ruling, that states
could constitutionally regulate in ways that clearly express hos-
tility to the choice to have an abortion, or in ways that impose
increased costs upon, and barriers to, abortion, so long as the
constraints do not place an "undue burden" upon a women who
wants to exercise her right, and the reflects a gross insensitivity
to equality. The Court's failure to see Pennsylvania's twenty-four-
hour waiting period and "informed consent" provisions as undue
burdens suggests the Court's failure to understand the link be-
tween equality and women's liberty in practice. As Chris Whit-
v. Casey and the Future of Sex Discrimination Law, 104 Yale L J 1875, 1875-76 (1995)
(noting that the joint opinion in Casey raised principles of sex equality and arguing that
this has implications for future equal protection analysis of reproductive difference); Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 NYU L Rev 1185, 1199 (1992) (noting
the Casey court's important recognition of the connection between a woman's control over
her reproductive destiny and her equal opportunities to participate in social and economic
life).
Casey, 505 US at 888-91.
Id at 895.
67 Id at 896-97. The Court bolstered its constitutional analysis of the spousal notifica-
tion provision by invoking equality principles. It asserted that a requirement amounting
to a husband's veto over his wife's choice was found unconstitutional in Planned Parent-
hood of Central Missouri v Danforth, 428 US 52, 69 (1976). Id at 897. The Court relied not
only on the traditional privacy framework invoked in reproductive rights (here, an undue
burden standard), but also on constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination.
Daly argues that the Court failed to "honestly" handle the spousal notification pro-
visions of the Pennsylvania law by adopting a liberty argument to the exclusion of an
explicit equal protection argument. Daly, 45 Am U L Rev at 147-48 (cited in note 17).
While this is a persuasive argument, Daly's later point that scholars should study the
shadow "rhetoric" of Casey along with its "holdings," see id at 148, is more pertinent to this
essay.
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man has recently observed, only total barriers to abortion in con-
crete contexts are, in fact, recognized as undue by Casey.59
Another example of the intersection between concepts of pri-
vacy and equality, although not in the constitutional equal pro-
tection context, is a recent case from the Western District of
Washington that has received much public attention, Erickson v
Bartell,° which involves the issue of contraceptive equity-the
failure of insurers to cover contraception and prescription contra-
ceptives such as birth control pills, Norplant, Depo-Provera, in-
trauterine devices and diaphragms under its prescription benefit
plan, while covering other medications and procedures that im-
pact male reproduction.6' In Erickson, the court held that the em-
ployer's decision to categorically exclude prescription contracep-
tives available only to women from its employee health benefits
violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act amendment to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.62 The Act prohibits discrimina-
tion on the basis of "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions'" as sex-based discrimination. In Erickson, the court
reasoned that contraceptives are of "immediate importance" to
the health of women throughout much of their lives" and that
Title VII requires employers to provide "equally comprehensive
coverage" which may include benefits for women only.' Further-
more, the court in Erickson recognized "that the availability of
affordable and effective contraceptives is of great importance to
the health of women and children because it can help to prevent a
litany of physical, emotional, economic, and social conse-
quences."66 This acknowledgment reflects the pronouncement in
"' Chris Whitman, Looking Back on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 100 Mich L Rev
1980, 1987 (2002).
60 141 F Supp 2d 1266 (W D Wash 2001).
61 Erickson argued that her employer's insurance coverage policy violated Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, by exclud-
ing prescription contraceptives and covering other preventive medicines. Id at 1268. The
Act prohibits sex-based discrimination on the basis of "pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions." Id at 1269. Finding for the plaintiff, the district court reasoned that
Title VII requires employers to provide "equally comprehensive coverage" which may in-
clude benefits for women only. Id at 1277. The court made the link between contraception
and women's full citizenship by acknowledging that "the availability of affordable and
effective contraceptives is of great importance to the health of women and children be-
cause it can help to prevent a litany of physical, emotion, economic, and social conse-
quences." Erickson, 141 F Supp 2d at 1273.
62 Id at 1269-71.
"3 Id at 1269, citing 42 USC 2000e(k) (2000).
64 Id at 1274.
65 Erickson, 141 F Supp 2d at 1277.
66 Id at 1273.
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Casey of the costs of unwanted pregnancy to women's full and
equal participation in society.6 7 The equality argument detectible
in Casey and explicit in Erickson indicates that, with respect to
the right to control their reproductive or parental destinies,
women and men are similarly situated. It is understood that
"equal means equivalent, not identical, making women's and
men's situations commensurable and therefore subject to mean-
ingful equal protection scrutiny."' This ruling has important im-
plications for the application of a gender equality challenge to
limitations on reproductive rights.
For twenty years, reproductive rights advocates have argued
that the issue of insurance coverage raises serious problems of
equality.' But, a result of the traditional emphasis on privacy in
the context of contraception is that the equality theme has been
lost. Equality arguments, which raised gender-based perspectives
on unequal insurance coverage for contraception, were dormant
for many years and then reemerged recently.0 Erickson is a good
example of a decision in which both privacy and equality are im-
plicated. The Court held that the employer's plan was invalid,
albeit under Title VII, but nonetheless, using an inequality
framework. Of course, the company could decide to restrict insur-
ance to everyone, leveling down, as it were, as opposed to leveling
up. But it is the intersection of both privacy and equality concepts
that does the job here.
It is important not to think simplistically about replacing
privacy with equality. Rather, we should recognize ways in which
each doctrine is flawed, and look to ways in which privacy and
equality strengthen each other. In Erickson, the right of contra-
ception, historically protected as a privacy interest, is looked at
more closely in an equality and equal access framework. 1 In the
area of gay and lesbian rights, the move toward equality is cru-
cial because we cannot reach issues of same-sex family privacy in
the homosexual context while a fundamental inequity exists be-
67 505 US at 856.
Daly, 45 Am U L Rev at 140 (cited in note 17).
69 See, for example, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 Tul
L Rev 451, 461-62 (1978).
76 See, for example, Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contracep-
tion, 73 Wash L Rev 363 (1998) (arguing that the exclusion of prescription contraceptives
from private insurance plans violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended
by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act).
71 The right to reproductive choice in Erickson is framed in terms of gender equity as
protected by Title VII law. See note 61.
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tween the treatment of heterosexuals and homosexuals.72 Simi-
larly, in the domestic violence context, it is critical for equality
issues to form the primary framework of understanding subordi-
nation in order to develop a more critical and nuanced perspec-
tive on privacy. These privacy problems inextricably flow out of,
and are linked to, fundamental inequality.
III. PRIVACY AND EQUALITY, EQUALITY AND PRIVACY
My work on privacy, equality and intimate violence empha-
sized the connections between equality and privacy. Battered
women seek the material and social condition of equality and self-
determination that make privacy possible. An equality perspec-
tive deepens our understanding of the way in which privacy is
applied. An equality perspective has led me to argue for a more
affirmative understanding of privacy in the women's rights con-
text, and has shaped my understanding of the way in which gen-
der and privacy are linked. Privacy that is grounded in equality
and is viewed as an aspect of autonomy, protecting bodily integ-
rity and making abuse impermissible, is based on a genuine rec-
ognition of dignity and personhood.
As the previous section illustrates, litigation in the area of
women's rights and gay rights has raised some of these argu-
ments. Other scholars have recognized this important relation-
ship between privacy and equality claims. Anita Allen has de-
scribed "co-dependency" and "mutual dependence" as apt charac-
terizations of the relationship between privacy and equality.7" She
observes that "[p1rivacy and equal protection are mutually de-
pendent, in my view, inasmuch as privacy rights can promote
equality and equal protection can promote privacy and privacy-
related liberties."" Bill Eskridge has written about the connection
between equal protection and privacy in the context of gay rights
and women's rights litigation.7 Pamela Karlan has examined
Justice Blackmun's "integrated understanding of liberty and
equality for gays and lesbians,"6 and emphasized the importance
72 See generally Andrew Koppelman, The Right to Privacy?, 2002 U Chi Legal F 105.
7' Allen, 18 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 421 n 5 (cited in note 7).
74 Id.
71 See Eskridge, 47 UCLA L Rev at 1186-1211 (cited in note 1); see also Nan D.
Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 Va L Rev 1695, 1716 (1993) (arguing that the
concepts of privacy and equality are inextricably linked with respect to gays' self-
identifying speech and the legal debate over homosexuality as status or conduct).
76 Karlan, 26 Hastings Const L Q at 67 (cited in note 1).
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of a "synergistic" and "double-barreled" interrelationship between
privacy and equality, in which due process and equality claims
create the foundation for and strengthen each other.77 Karlan uses
the example of voting rights, where "[tihe suspect-classification
arguments of early Warren Court voting rights cases contributed
to the Court's adoption of a fundamental rights perspective [in
later voting rights cases] -the importance of protecting the right
to vote was driven home by the invidiousness of the distinction
that kept some citizens from the polls."78 Karlan examines this
synergy-what she calls the "stereoscopic" dimensions of equality
and privacy-more closely in a recent article, where she details
the ways in which equality and privacy can expand, but also limit
each other.7' But this synergy has operated in other areas as well.
A similarly broad view of the link between privacy and equal-
ity has been recognized by the South African Constitutional
Court. In that Court's decision in National Coalition for Gay and
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice," the Court struck down
provisions that criminalized sexual activity between men on both
equality and privacy grounds.8' The Court declared that the plain-
tiffs' claim "illustrates how, in particular circumstances, the
rights of equality and dignity are closely related, as are the rights
of dignity and privacy."'2 The Court held:
Privacy recognises that we all have a right to a sphere of
private intimacy and autonomy which allows us to estab-
lish and nurture human relationships without interfer-
ence from the outside community. The way in which we
give expression to our sexuality is at the core of this area
of private intimacy.... We should not deny the impor-
tance of a right to privacy in our new constitutional order,
even while we acknowledge the importance of equality. In
fact, emphasising the breach of both these rights in the
present case highlights just how egregious the invasion of
the constitutional rights of gay persons has been. The of-
fence which lies at the heart of the discrimination in this
case constitutes at the same time and independently a
breach of the rights of privacy and dignity which, without
77 Id at 64. See also Karlan, - McGeorge L Rev at - (forthcoming) (cited in note 7).
78 Karlan, 26 Hastings Const L Q at 64 (cited in note 1).
79 Karlan, __ McGeorge L Rev at _ (forthcoming) (cited in note 7).
80 1998 SACLR LEXIS 36 (Const Ct).
8" Id at *59.
82 Id at *63.
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doubt, strengthens the conclusion that the discrimination
is unfair.'
Justice Albie Sachs's concurring opinion makes the connec-
tion even more explicit. The challengers had emphasized equal-
ity-based arguments, but Justice Sachs emphasized the impor-
tance of liberty- and privacy-based arguments as well.
The fact is that both from the point of view of the persons
affected, as well as from that of society as a whole, equal-
ity and privacy cannot be separated, because they are both
violated simultaneously by anti-sodomy laws. In the pre-
sent matter, such laws deny equal respect for difference,
which lies at the heart of equality, and becomes the basis
for the invasion of privacy. At the same time, the negation
by the state of different forms of intimate personal behav-
iour becomes the foundation for the repudiation of equal-
ity. Human rights are better approached and defended in
an integrated rather than a disparate fashion. The rights
must fit the people, not the people the rights. This re-
quires looking at rights and their violations from a per-
sons-centred rather than a formula-based position, and
analysing them contextually rather than abstractly.4
This more integrated understanding of constitutional rights
of privacy and equality is important. Emphasizing the breach of
both of these rights and their impact on each other can offer new
insights. We need to detail legal arguments of privacy, liberty,
and equality together, and examine more closely the way in
which both claims support and reinforce each other in specific
constitutional contexts. As in the area of intimate violence, the
equality framework can shape our understanding of lack of pri-
vacy, and deepen our perspectives on the importance of that pri-
vacy. Understanding the problematic dimensions of privacy can
enrich our understanding of equality. Equality shapes our appre-
ciation of the dimensions of women's privacy and autonomy that
need affirmative protection. Looking at privacy and equality in
tandem can move us beyond a comparative framework and to-
wards recognition of the synergy of privacy and equality in con-
crete contexts.
' Id at *65-66.
National Coalition, 1998 SACLR LEXIS 36, at *139-40.
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